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In contrast to the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
a successful Doha Round of WTO 
negotiations is likely to bring ma-
jor changes in international dairy 
markets. Some countries protect 
their domestic producers by using 
restrictive tariff rate quotas (TRQ) 
and high over-quota import duties. 
And large export subsidies allow the 
European Union and other countries 
to continue to export dairy products 
despite high internal price supports. 
The signifi cant tariff cuts and elimi-
nation of export subsidies currently 
proposed in the Doha negotiations 
would create notable shortages in 
international dairy markets in the 
near term. Rising world prices will 
undoubtedly generate a supply 
response in countries with histori-
cally strong dairy industries, such as 
New Zealand and Australia, but it is 
less clear which other countries will 
step up to fi ll the void created by the 
removal of subsidized products and 
meet market opportunities created 
by lower tariffs. Argentina and Chile 
are two potential benefi ciaries of a 
new WTO agreement. We review key 
fi ndings of a recent CARD study on 
these two countries’ dairy sectors 
and draw lessons for U.S. dairy.
Argentine Dairy: Strong but 
with Continuing Challenges
Argentina has a century-old tradition 
of dairy production. In 1999, Argen-
tina was 13th in global milk produc-
tion, right behind New Zealand. In 
that same year, Argentina was a major 
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exporter of whole milk powder and 
a growing exporter of cheese. The 
economic crisis in 2001 prompted a 
severe contraction of dairy produc-
tion. The sector has emerged from 
the crisis as a viable industry with 
tremendous potential. 
Argentina has several critical 
assets that contribute to its competi-
tive advantage in milk production. 
First, feedstuffs are abundant and of 
high quality. Argentina’s primary milk 
producing regions co-exist geographi-
cally with its vast cropping regions, 
thereby assuring low feed costs. 
These regions have adequate land to 
facilitate both crop production and 
improved pasture, without intense 
competition. Second, Argentine dairy 
farmers have access to and use high-
quality genetic stock. Third, Argen-
tine dairy farms are generally well 
managed by experienced producers 
who can produce excellent quality 
milk. They have the infrastructure 
on the farms (automated milking and 
on-farm cold storage) to preserve the 
quality of the milk and to meet inter-
national standards for export. 
Argentina has a competitive 
processing sector dominated by a 
number of large fi rms with a clear 
export orientation. Many of the 
top fi rms have long been involved 
with export markets and have built 
brand recognition in foreign mar-
kets. Moreover, the connections 
between domestic fi rms and inter-
national partners, such as Nestlé, 
Fonterra, and Saputo, give Argen-
tine processors access to expanded 
marketing expertise abroad. These 
processors have proven they have 
the ability to meet international 
consumers’ demand for quality and 
product safety.
The road infrastructure in Ar-
gentina is excellent, even in remote 
areas. This is in sharp contrast to 
Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Chile. 
The transportation and communi-
cation infrastructures seem more 
than adequate to allow quick price 
discovery and easy communication 
between the processors and farm-
ers for sample test results and other 
marketing matters. Pricing incen-
tives are already in place to pay 
farmers for low bacteria counts, high 
fat, and high milk-solid content. 
Despite these advantages, 
Argentina’s dairy sector faces sig-
nifi cant challenges in expanding its 
production and exports. Since the 
fi nancial crisis, a great source of un-
certainty for investors in Argentina 
has been the instability of the Ar-
gentine currency and the threats of 
price control. The peso underwent 
a massive devaluation in 2002. The 
peso is now expected to appreciate 
in real terms against the U.S. dollar 
because of relatively high infl a-
tion in Argentina. Competitiveness 
based on the massive devaluation 
will be progressively eaten away by 
infl ation. Argentina’s domestic and 
trade policies add to the uncertain-
ty for dairy producers. Argentina 
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imposes a 15 percent export tax on 
most dairy products, handicapping 
the industry. Value-added-tax re-
funds on exports were eliminated as 
well after 2001. The government has 
a history of adjusting the export tax 
rate as international prices change, 
and this discretionary approach to 
taxation adds to the uncertainty of 
future profi tability for dairy produc-
ers and processors. 
The export tax raises govern-
ment revenues and lowers the cost 
of food for urban constituencies. Ex-
ports are a convenient source of fi s-
cal resources. In addition, the gov-
ernment has threatened to impose 
a price freeze on dairy products, 
effectively resulting in administered 
price controls. These tactics have 
been employed in other agricultural 
sectors, most notably in beef. Price 
controls on consumer products 
have ripple effects; processors are 
then forced to lower raw milk prices 
to offset their lost sales revenue. 
The negative impact of these disas-
trous policies is seen in Argentina’s 
country risk rating, which is among 
the worst in Latin America. Market 
access issues, mostly tariffs and 
TRQs, are the primary barriers to 
Argentine dairy exports. Argen-
tina exports milk powder to OPEC 
countries (Algeria, Iran, Iraq, and 
Nigeria) that tend to have relatively 
low duties on powder. For example, 
Algeria applied a 5 percent duty on 
milk powder products. Subsidized 
products, primarily from the Euro-
pean Union, have some negative 
impacts on Argentina’s potential 
foreign sales because Argentine ex-
ports compete with EU exports.
Chilean Dairy: Poised for Growth
Over the last two decades, the 
government of Chile has been com-
mitted to an open economy, which 
has led to extremely low tariffs by 
international standards, increasing 
competitiveness in export-orient-
ed and import-competing sectors 
and to signifi cant integration into 
world markets. As a result, Chilean 
agriculture has shown remarkable 
growth, both in terms of total value 
and productivity. The growth in ag-
ricultural exports is double that of 
the country’s GDP growth, approxi-
mately 10 to 12 percent annually. 
The central valleys of Chile, with 
their temperate conditions and dry 
summers, produce most of the high-
valued agricultural products. In the 
southern Los Lagos (10th) region, 
where roughly 70 percent of Chile’s 
milk is produced, the climate is 
wetter, supporting lush grasslands 
and pasture. However, the bulk of 
Chile’s population and demand for 
dairy products is further north in 
the Santiago area. Consequently, 
much of the milk produced in the 
south is processed for transport 
north as milk powder or shipped to 
export destinations. Only roughly 
half of the pasture resources in the 
10th region is currently used, so 
there is great potential for substan-
tial growth in dairy production.
Historically, Chile has been a 
small net importer of dairy prod-
ucts. In 2004, Chile became a net 
exporter of dairy products. While 
making this transition from import-
er to exporter, Chile’s dairy produc-
tion lost natural protection from 
tariffs and from the costs of interna-
tional transportation. A reduction 
in milk and dairy prices occurred in 
Los Lagos early in the decade, and 
milk production costs are now at 
levels that are competitive on world 
markets. Chile’s pursuit of free trade 
agreements has opened doors for its 
dairy industry in foreign markets. 
The country has become the largest 
exporter of hard cheeses to Mexi-
co, shipping roughly 18,000 metric 
tons of cheese annually under its 
preferential agreement. The agree-
ment with China in 2005 is expected 
to lead to an increase in China’s 
imports of Chilean whey powder in 
the near term and in cheese imports 
after fi ve years.
Chile’s 10th region shares many 
characteristics with the dairy areas 
in New Zealand. However, Chile’s 
dairy sector has been oriented to-
ward non-seasonal production for 
decades to provide a steady supply 
of milk and dairy products to San-
tiago and other population centers. 
If Chile is to expand its infl uence 
on international dairy markets, the 
dairy industry will need to embrace 
a more export-oriented approach 
to production and marketing. This 
will require investment so that 
dairy farms can upgrade to meet 
international quality standards. 
Chile currently lacks the fi nancial 
and support services necessary 
to modernize its dairy operations, 
particularly using seasonal pro-
duction, which is popular in New 
Zealand. Farmers fi nd it diffi cult to 
secure fi nancing for investments and 
for working capital. Likewise, the 
local insemination, veterinary, and 
contract labor systems needed for 
effi cient management of a seasonal 
dairy operation are not in place. 
Milk-processing capacity is near full 
utilization, and additional capac-
ity currently under construction 
is partially offset by the closure of 
a number of small cheese plants. 
In contrast to Argentina, Chile is 
a safe and profi table investment 
location and receives the best risk 
The signifi cant tariff cuts 
and elimination of export 
subsidies currently 
proposed in the Doha 
negotiations would 
create notable shortages 
in international dairy 
markets in the near term. 
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ratings in Latin America. The pres-
ence of Nestlé and Fonterra in Chile 
may provide some of the fi nancial 
resources needed to promote a 
general increase in production scale 
and accelerate the rate of technol-
ogy adoption.
Our research suggests that the 
reduction of tariffs and elimination 
of subsidized dairy exports in a new 
WTO agreement will increase milk 
production in Argentina and Chile 
by 7 and 4 percent, respectively, 
over expected production under 
current policies. Argentine milk 
powder exports will increase by 
more than 20 percent, and cheese 
exports will rise more than 50 per-
cent. Similar impacts are projected 
for Chilean whole milk powder and 
cheese exports. However, the expan-
sion of Argentine dairy trade will be 
signifi cantly lower if the government 
does not eliminate its taxes on dairy 
exports.
International Prospects 
for U.S. Dairy Industries
These two case studies shed light 
on U.S. dairy prospects in global 
markets. The U.S. dairy industry 
combines most of the sources of 
competitiveness characterizing its 
two South American competitors: 
availability of inexpensive feed 
and land in many regions suitable 
for dairy production, high human 
capital, access to modern technol-
ogy, an effi cient processing sec-
tor, excellent transportation and 
communication infrastructures, low 
capital cost and credit risk, and a 
tradition in dairy production. So it 
is puzzling that the United States 
does not export more dairy prod-
ucts. The current U.S. dairy pro-
gram, with its price distortions and 
border impediments, obscures the 
international competitiveness of 
U.S. dairy and provides producers 
with incentives to cater to domes-
tic rather than to foreign markets. 
Reducing these domestic incen-
tives would force the U.S. dairy 
industry to turn outward, where it 
is well equipped to be internation-
ally competitive in world markets, 
especially if all countries reform 
their own distorting policies. ◆ 
Dairy in Argentina and Chile
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expansion are not the most cost-
effi cient means of maintaining the 
status quo. 
All evidence suggests that high 
premium subsidies are needed to 
induce farmers to join the program. 
The overall cost of these subsidies 
could be reduced if the structure of 
premium subsidies was changed to 
decrease the incentive for farmers 
to buy the most expensive forms 
of crop insurance. We previously es-
timated that $300 million could be 
saved by such a move. 
Signifi cant savings could also be 
obtained by changing the way that 
A&O subsidies are determined. Most 
of these funds are captured by crop 
insurance agents. But given the grow-
ing familiarity of farmers with the 
program and the currently large mar-
ket penetration of insurance, do we 
need to continue to pay large com-
missions simply to maintain farmers 
in the program? One alternative is to 
pay a commission directly to those 
farmers who sign up for crop insur-
ance through the Internet or directly 
with RMA. Recent political battles be-
tween agents and innovative compa-
nies over premium reduction plans 
that allow farmers to capture a por-
tion of agent commissions indicates 
how diffi cult it would be to wean the 
industry away from the status quo of 
high commissions.
Considerable savings could 
also be obtained by making under-
writing gains and losses the sole 
responsibility of the federal govern-
ment. As illustrated here, the com-
pensation required to induce com-
panies to take on a small amount 
of risk (relative to the gains that 
they obtain) is large. We estimate 
that taxpayers would benefi t by an 
average of $435 million per year if 
USDA directly underwrote all risks 
from the crop insurance program. 
A potential downside from having 
the government underwrite all risk 
is that companies would lose the 
incentive they now have in their re-
tained business to prevent fraud. ◆ 
Crop Insurance
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